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Oliver Wendell Holmes once gave us the aphorism that law is prophecy as to what the courts will do. While the gift of prophecy may not be
sufficient to complete the practitioner's art, it is doubtless a necessary
feature of creative practice of law.
The purpose of this paper is to determine what the legal effect of the
abortion decisions has been with a view to understanding the direction the
legal issues are likely to take. Let us assume agreement with respect to the
policy implications of these decisions, so that we may concentrate on the
legal implications of the 1973 decisions as they affect certain fundamental
concepts.

It must be assumed primarily that law is inherently didactic: that is,
that law has a teaching as well as a coercive effect. If one remembers that
there are over 200 million people in this country, it is clear that the effect
of the law as a teaching instrument is what really makes the system work.
There is no way that any government can force its will upon all people
without some basic agreement among those people as to the function of the
law and the values to which the law addresses itself. This is something to
keep uppermost in mind in consideration of this issue. These abortion
decisions do more than simply regulate the practice of abortion; they do
more than simply describe the behavior of the majority. They teach us
something about the values to which we subscribe.
If the didactic function of law is a reality, then the question that
follows is: What is the substance of the teaching? How does one determine
what is to be taught?
A strictly legal adjudication is an adjudication predicated on the application of certain rules of procedure and substantive rules to specific

factual situations. A purposive adjudication is, on the other hand, an adjudication of a conflict on the basis of arriving at some end, some goal, some
purpose. The purposive type of adjudication is well known to American

lawyers as the public policy argument. It is not an uncommon experience
for the practitioner to argue a case in a legal context, with reasonable
assurance of success, only to have rules of law put aside on the basis of
public policy.
The difficulty with any public policy adjudication is that it is directly
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related to the didactic function. The judge has identified a purpose. We
know he has the power to use his office as a teaching office, but how does
he arrive at the purpose that is going to motivate him? How does he
determine what specific goal he is going to work toward? The judge, like
the rest of us, partakes of the intellectual climate of opinion of his own
culture and the values which he finds there work to shape his view of public
policy. It is in this manner that it can be said that law follows philosophy.
The legal thought of the twentieth century has been profoundly marked
by the philosophy of the nineteenth century.
It is in this context that the abortion cases have to be viewed as
growing not out of a vacuum, but rather out of a historic libertarian effect
to be traced as far back as Mills' essay On Liberty.
The legal significance of this movement is very pervasive. One of the
most important aspects of it for the understanding of the abortion conflict
is the glorification of an atomistic individualism. Prior to Eisenstadt v.
Baird, the right to privacy was consistently and uniformly viewed as a
familial right. The cases which form the root of the present privacy concept are cases which deal with the limitation of government action on the
rights of families. Myers v. Nebraska, and Pierce v. Sisters, are always
cited, even in Roe v. Wade, as being the root of the present privacy concept. These cases historically recognize the government's obligation to
respect familial structures and to heed certain prerogatives with the familial structure was presumed to have attendant to it. Marriage was recognized as an institution, something that was substantially greater than the
union of two people, and that when there was a marriage an institution was
formed that was cognizable at law.
In Eisenstadt, Justice Brennan changed all that with one sentence. In
a reference to the institution of marriage he stated the institution was the
free association of two individuals. With that one stroke, he rewrote the
constitutional law of the family which had been in existence for almost a
century.
It is generally true that women do not become pregnant by themselves.
And it is for this reason that much abortion litigation which has followed
from the 1973 decisions has touched upon relationships between husbands
and wives, mothers and fathers, girlfriends and boyfriends. The legal relationships of these people have all figured into the calculus of abortion
practice. Had the Supreme Court recognized any inherent legal significance in these relationships, it would have been required to balance those
interests and those rights over and against the rights of the woman to
practice abortion. On the contrary, the Court is really committed to a view
of society in which the basic unit is not the family but the individual.
Individuals may associate in various groups, including families and marriages. However, these relationships are always characterized as being in
the nature of an aggregation. The unit is simply a group without any higher
cohesive or legally cognizable internal structure.
In the Danforth case which is styled Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth,
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the Court took the position that a spouse had no rights with respect to the
abortion practice because the state could not give any right to the spouse
that the state did not itself have. There were two assumptions on which
this is grounded: first, that the only right that a spouse could have with
regard to abortion is that right which the state gives it, and that the only
legally cognizable relationship that any individual may have is vis-a-vis
the state itself.
The Court used the same rationale in striking down the statutory
consent provision of the Missouri law, which required parental consent for
a minor who is attempting to have an abortion. There is no recognition in
the Danforth opinion that there may be some legally cognizable obligation
which the minor has to her parents which arises out of the nature of the
relationship between them. Implicit in the Danforthdecision is the conception that the only rights that parents and spouses have vis-A-vis the abortion patient are the rights which the state gives them in a relationship also
given to them by the state.
In Baird v. Bellotti, which was argued and decided on the same day
that the Danforth decision came down, the Supreme Court sent a Massachusetts law back to the state court for adjudication of the question
whether or not the statute could be construed as merely giving notice to
parents, rather than a "veto." The state court subsequently construed the
statute to be in fact a notice statute. The question then went before the
federal district court in Boston as to whether or not the notice statute was
constitutional and the district court found that the statute was in fact
unconstitutional. That matter is on appeal at the Supreme Court at this
writing.
The most remarkable feature of the glorification of the individual
which has taken place during the last 10 years is the fact that the individual who is being glorified here does not exist. The individual who is supposed to benefit from this protection is an abstraction. All of us have a
past, we have a family, we have other important relationships with other
people with whom we interact. Many psychologists (among them Harry
Stack Sullivan and Rollo May) have argued that human personality is
really found in interaction between people; it is the relationship between
people that delineates and sharpens their respective personalities. We may
at least accept the idea that it is the perception of connections of necessity
that gives rise to our legal definition of "person." However, we have
learned from the past 10 years in the abortion controversy that we are faced
with a legal system that is geared to accommodate what is essentially an
abstraction. This trend is not likely to be reversed as society rushes to fit
the mold which the abstractions have formed.
To return to Justice Holmes' definition of law as prophecy as to what
courts will do, it is reasonable to predict that the courts will continue in
the near future to advance the aggregation concept of social and familial
relationships and to emphasize the individual rather than the relationships
which they might be engaged in.
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Another significant legal development of the abortion cases is the
Court's separation of the notion of personhood from biology. Prior to the
Roe v. Wade decision, there was the presumption that the term "life" as
used in the fourteenth amendment should be construed to be human life
as defined by biology. The Supreme Court created a distinction when it
used the term "potential human life" describing human life, which biology
itself does not make. In biology the fetus is a human life, but Justice
Blackmun, and the members of the Court who agreed with him, have
argued that there is something more needed in order to be protected by
the fifth amendment than simple biology. They have argued that life must
be meaningful and that the source of such meaning is provided by a consensus. The Court never specified who has the right to vote on this particular case. Mr. Justice Blackmun said there seemed to be a consensus that
"viable" fetal life was meaningful. This consensus is vital to the invocation
of constitutional protection of life, because this consensual element is what
provides the meaning.
The significance of that can be seen in the definition of death bill that
talked about meaningful life, the termination of life which is not meaningful. Professor Gayman, writing for the Hastings Institute of Bioethics, has
pointed out that statutes designed to facilitate transplants ought to be
centered around a conception of personhood which is separate from that
of biology. He argues that the same approach that was taken with respect
to fetal life ought to be taken with respect to the dying patient. Where the
higher functions are no longer in effect, that life cannot be meaningful and
therefore the person can be presumed to be dead.
Until the decision in Roe and Doe, the line drawing evidenced in the
death with dignity and definition of death legislation could not exist.
These line drawing problems are a product of the abstraction of personhood from biology. We are going to see a continuation of this line drawing
and of this separation at both ends of the life spectrum.
For instance, courts will find that when children are defective at birth,
there is some question as to whether their life is meaningful.
Sociological and consensual elements will be churned into the legal
definition and review of what is to be protected and what is not to be
protected. That is perhaps the most important legal result of the abortion
decisions, notwithstanding the policy application-the principle of separating personhood from biology will be applicable in many areas.
One of the statutory provisions challenged in the Danforth argument
was the duty of the physician to protect the life of the child who survived
an abortion. During questioning of the attorneys in that case, Chief Justice
Burger asked whether the care to be given there would be extraordinary
or ordinary. At the time I was amused by the use of those terms because
they really come out of theological context and there is no historical legal
framework to which those terms relate. I see now, though, that when the
decision was rendered these terms were very important, for the court did
rule in Danforth that an infant survivor of an abortion is entitled to
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"ordinary" care as opposed to "extraordinary" care. Thus, for the aborted
fetus, who parenthetically does not have the opportunity to execute a
living will, the Supreme Court has decided that (s)he will receive a different standard of care than other neonates might receive under similar circumstances.
There is a case in North Carolina involving the starvation death of an
infant who survived abortion. While the laws governing the use of abortion
had the effect, prior to 1973, of restricting medical use of abortion and
enforcing the highest available standard of care in our hospitals, today the
law and current practice cannot be said to abide by the highest standard
of care. While "extraordinary" care for a fetus may be presumed to include
all means at one's disposal, what are the lower limits of care beneath which
"ordinary" care is no longer being provided to one who has endured an
abortion and survived?
From the foregoing it should be clear that the abortion decisions have
removed the anchor of constitutional protection of life from biology. Legally, the fifth amendment is construed to protect the kinds of life about
which there is a consensus, that they are meaningful. As the consensus as
to what is meaningful moves and changes, so will the law and so will the
protection provided by it.
There are three cases presently pending before the Court, Medicaid
cases essentially: one out of the Third Circuit, one out of the District Court
of Connecticut, and one out of St. Louis.
The Connecticut case calls into debate whether or not the concepts of
pregnancy and of abortion can be constitutionally separated at all. The
state of Connecticut has a Medicaid plan which serves necessary medical
problems only, and prohibits coverage for any elective treatment including
elective abortion. That distinction was found to be violative of equal protection. The Court now has under submission the question whether elective
abortion can be treated differently in law than any other treatment relating to pregnancy.
The same result was found in the Pennsylvania case. The Third Circuit, however, reached that result through a statutory construction of the
Social Security Act. The issue presented before the Supreme Court is
whether or not the proper statutory construction of the Social Security Act
requires payment for abortion.
The famous Hyde Amendment case is also before the court on a motion to obtain jurisdiction under direct appeal. The Court has not acted
on the jurisdictional question. Most observers suspect that this is because
the Court seeks to resolve the equal protection question in Maher. If the
Court does rule that there is a constitutional requirement to treat abortion
and pregnancy as the same thing, then there will be only one surviving
issue in the Hyde case, and that will be the issue relating to the government's separate power argument: that the Congress cannot be subject to
judicial review for appropriations. That question may in fact be moot
because the bill to which the restriction on appropriations is appended will

23

CATHOLIC

LAWYER,

SUMMER

1978

expire by October of this year, that is, before the Court's next term. It may
well be that if the Court recognizes a constitutional obligation to treat
abortion and pregnancy the same way, it will then wait and see whether
or not the Hyde Amendment is reenacted this year. If it is, then the mootness question will be resolved. The Court will have to deal only with the
separation of powers question.
Throughout the debate that has raged back and forth over the abortion question, we have been confronted with the charge that the Church's
opposition to abortion constitutes an imposition of the Church's religious
belief on the body politic. If a man should come to me and say that the
sun rises in the west, I would say to him, "no, it rises in the east." Might
he not reply in the same vein, "you are trying to impose your religious
beliefs on me?" From the empirical evidence, biology, it is well accepted
that human life goes forward as a process, we do not trip between adolescence and old age, that we are somehow mysteriously the same person, and
somehow we are different. What we are contesting is, indeed, truth. We
bear witness to the fact that democratic government presupposes the ability of all participants of society to speak as to what they believe to be the
truth. The fact that one can persuade someone that something is true is
not necessarily an imposition. We should go forward as we have with the
witness that we have carried on in the last four years.
In the face of the atomistic individualism which has produced the
aggregation view of the family, we must work to develop a basis in legal
theory for the renewal of protection for the family. We must devote more
effort to restructuring or reconstructing some of the basic legal concepts
respecting the individual, society and the family. The task-not only of
church members but of the body politic as a whole-is to engage in the
democratic process with an eye towards moving society closer to the truth.
If anything is to grow out of this effort it may be an appreciation for the
fact that law must ultimately yield not to mere concensus but to some
realities that are evident. The protection of human life is a value for which
we must continue to work.

